By Benedikt Paul Gocke
Although physicalism has been the dominant place in fresh paintings within the philosophy of brain, this dominance has now not avoided a small yet turning out to be variety of philosophers from arguing that physicalism is untenable for numerous purposes: either ontologically and epistemologically it can't decrease mentality to the area of the actual, and its makes an attempt to minimize subjectivity to objectivity have completely failed. The members to After Physicalism offer robust possible choices to the physicalist account of the human brain from a dualistic perspective and argue that the reductive and naturalistic paradigm in philosophy has misplaced its force.
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Extra resources for After Physicalism
44 Uwe Meixner 4. See the first and second of Descartes’s Meditations. The in-principle possibility of the world of consciousness existing all by itself can be used as a premise for establishing substance dualism; see my neo-Cartesian argument in Meixner 2004. 5. The attempt to do so leads to absurdity, because it seeks to obtain a perspective for the acquisition of knowledge that is not a perspective for a conscious subject: the view from nowhere, as Thomas Nagel was to call this impossible perspective.
Baker’s weak first person comes close to what I dub the pre-reflective subject of a stream of consciousness, and her strong first person comes close to what is my self-reflective subject. However, whereas on my conception a conscious being can be both—sometimes 22 Benedikt Paul Göcke a weak first person and only in reflection a strong first person—Baker’s account seems to be an either-or classification. Because every particular is essentially a physical particular or a nonphysical one, questions concerning the identity of conscious beings are modal questions.
The desk is a commonsense object. Therefore, according to Moore in 1939, it follows that the desk is a mind-independent object; in other words, according to Moore in 1939, relative to the desk being a commonsense object, it is necessary that it be a mind-independent object.